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Fiduciary Duties - Indemnification, Prepetition and
Pursuing Actions Before Filing*
Mr. Richard M. Cieri, Mr. David Fischer &
Ms. Judith Greenstone Miller
MR. CIERI: We are going to do this one a little differently. I have a
Power Point presentation, and we're going to go through it, but we're
not going to just go through it and not have any discussion. In fact,
what I'd like to do is try to provoke discussion on almost every page
of the presentation. I hope we have people from the audience who
also will participate in the discussion because I think there are really
very interesting issues we could discuss in terms of fiduciary duties
and how you handle fiduciary responsibilities when you're insolvent
or within that mythical zone of insolvency.
In a vast majority of the cases those of us who do mainly debtor's
work are brought in prepetition. And if we're not brought in that
early, those are probably the cases we shouldn't be involved in. When
I approach a debtor and its management team, I say, one of my jobs is
to protect you to make sure there's a good record that you fulfilled
your fiduciary duties and responsibilities. And that is because, if you
look at the first bullet point, anything a director or an officer does
prepetition, prior to filing the bankruptcy case, is going to be subject
to review with 20/20 hindsight.
Actually, there are lawyers who will go into financially troubled
companies and tell the members of the board to resign. I actually
think that is bad advice. The problem a board faces is not after the
case has commenced, because as everybody knows, out-of-the-ordi-
nary-course transactions actually need bankruptcy court approval.
The problem is just prior to the filing of the case or when the com-
pany is operating in the zone of insolvency and you don't have a court
to approve a transaction, that's when directors and officers could get
into the most trouble. How do our panelists feel about that
statement?
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the second panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Mega-Bankruptcies: Representing Creditors and
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MR. FISCHER: Well, I think that it puts an innocent, outside direc-
tor in a horrible spot because you have this notion of a zone of insol-
vency and then there is the fiduciary duty that a director has to its
shareholders. As the company gets into the zone of insolvency and
actually becomes insolvent, that fiduciary duty shifts to a duty to the
creditors. No director really knows how to handle it. Nobody knows
really what to do, and everybody gets very nervous.
And if you think about it, it's a shift that just puts people in never,
never land. And then couple that with questions that may arise re-
garding benefits to insiders. For example, the debtor needs to be reor-
ganized. You're getting ready to do it. You do what you should do,
which is take the debtor through the grill of what the schedules are
going to look like. The debtor discovers there are gargantuan insider
preferences.
I guess the directors, who would have to disgorge these preferences,
have a little bit of a problem if they decide not to file the case because
of the preferences out there.
MR. CIERI: The answer to the question is clear; the directors abso-
lutely have an obligation to commence the case in order to protect the
preference state. Now, it may be real hard for the directors to do that;
as lawyers we try to protect our directors by constructing a good pro-
cess, a process that hopefully in 20/20 hindsight people can understand
and the directors can utilize and defend their approvals with if it later
turns out that they made a mistake. However, I believe that you can
never defend a failure to pursue an avoidance action.
MS. MILLER: The other thing that I know you suggested that we're
going to get to is, on the one hand, it's clear when you're not insolvent
that the obligations flow to the shareholders. It's also clear when
you're insolvent that the duties only go to the creditors. But what
about in that zone of insolvency?
MR. CIERI: We're going to get there.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, is it so clear that once you're insolvent,
the duties only go to creditors?
MR. CIERI: Martin, I'm going to get there because I actually remem-
ber a very well-written article by your predecessor, Mr. Miller that in
a footnote discusses whether or not the fiduciary duties of directors of
an insolvent corporation completely shift from shareholders to credi-
tors, so I'm going to prompt you on that.
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But I just want to get back to the first question, whether it is the
right thing for directors to resign if they find themselves in financial
distress.
MR. FISCHER: Well, from the perspective of what's best for them
and how they can protect themselves once they're in court, it seems to
me, as you pointed out, they're in great shape. It's before that where
there are issues, but I don't think resigning helps. But on the other
hand, if you're truly an outside director and you don't know what's
going on, things can be happening that can get you in trouble.
MR. CIERI: Which is why I suggested they're better off staying on
and monitoring the situation.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And I agree with Rick. The taint and percep-
tion that the captain of the ship abandoning his helm leaving all his
passengers on board to sink will come back and haunt you. I think if
you stay around and do your level best to manage the situation, at the
end of the day, you've got a better chance of escaping liability, head-
aches aside.
MR. CIERI: Does anybody believe that you have a legal obligation
to stay on the board?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: You mean, is it a breach in and of itself to
leave?
MR. CIERI: Yes.
MR. FISCHER: I think a case could be made that maybe you do.
HON. FITZGERALD: What if you've taken a position that's ada-
mantly opposed to what the majority of inside directors are doing, and
they won't listen? I don't see how it could be a breach for you to
resign under those circumstances.
MR. CIERI: I tend to agree.
MS. MILLER: I want to agree with that. You want to establish a
record, though, and be able to justify after the fact whatever decision
you have made; so that if it comes back to bite you, you have some-
thing to support it.
MR. CIERI: The second bullet point raises the question of what hap-
pens to a director's fiduciary duties when there's a parent wholly-
owned subsidiary relationship.
For example, if you have a parent corporation that has a variety of
businesses and the board of the now insolvent subsidiary shares com-
mon directors with the parent corporation or is completely under the
control of the inside parent corporation directors, what does a director
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of a now insolvent wholly-owned subsidiary do? Do you, as the advi-
sor to that wholly-owned subsidiary, suggest that the board be
changed immediately, or do you say let's work through it and see what
happens?
How do the panelists feel about that?
MR. BAIRD: Just to complicate things and foreshadow the next ses-
sion, for each question you could also ask about the lawyer. If you're
a lawyer for the parent and subsidiary, what are your responsibilities
and how do you straighten those out?
MR. CIERI: Well, actually, let me answer that one because I have an
interesting situation where I have a power company that owns a bunch
of regulated utilities throughout the country. They are an indepen-
dent power producer which is having financial difficulties. I repre-
sented both the parent and a subsidiary for the longest period of time
and attempted to engage an out-of-court workout.
What happened then was the creditors came to me and said the
perception is that you have a conflict, and you will find in these situa-
tions, I think Professor, that you can never beat perception, and you
just have to resign.
But what do you do with the board? Do you change the board or
when you show up on the scene do you just keep the same directors?
I'll tell you what I've done. I've told the subsidiary board to stay in
place and to see how things develop and to see if a real conflict actu-
ally exists between the parent and subsidiary.
But I also suggest to them that they have to understand that their
ability to get the protections in the business judgment world are prob-
ably very limited.
MR. FISCHER: I wouldn't want to serve on that board, in that
instance.
MR. CIERI: Well, if you were getting indemnified from the parent
you might.
MR. FISCHER: How big is the parent?
HON. FITZGERALD: Even then, though, you're still subject to law-
suits. I have a whole lot of lawsuits, pending right now, alleging
breach of fiduciary obligations as a result of the fact there are com-
mon boards. They're tough. They're very difficult issues to address.
MR. CIERI: Okay. Obviously what is really important here is that as
a lawyer, you have to understand in advising a board that any time a
company files for bankruptcy, that prepetition decisions made by that
board will be subject to 20/20 hindsight.
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And what is most difficult for a board, and, again, I'm going to
throw it to the panelists, what do you do in the situation in which the
company is teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, but you decide to try
and do a rescue financing by securing up prepetition debt in order to
get some new out of court financing?
A good example, by the way, is Federal Mogul where the directors
made a decision to secure old money prior in the hopes of avoiding a
Chapter 11 filing, yet the company subsequently filed.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Did they get new money, Rick? Or was it basi-
cally forbearance?
MR. CIERI: It was probably forbearance.
MR. FISCHER: I think the question has to go a little further than
that. What additional value did the person putting the money in re-
ceive? Furthermore, is somebody in 20/20 hindsight going to say that
they did something untoward as a result of their rescue plan, even
though there should be the cardinal rule that new money always rules.
MR. CIERI: Now, what David is referring to is, does the director
breach its fiduciary duties by engaging in the process of securing old
money?
Did the company receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for that old money or for forbearance or for some amount of new
money to secure old money?
MR. BAIRD: It's antecedent debt.
MR. FISCHER: But I'm talking about you putting in new money.
Let's suppose that you're an old creditor or an old shareholder who
puts in new money. Furthermore, let's suppose that you want the deal
the new money would get in this situation. However, when held
under the microscope the deal looks bad because you were the old
money and you were a director. You're at risk and you're at greater
risk because of your relationship to the debtor, than Warren Buffet
who you brought in and who was just going to put the money in. Per-
ception is reality.
MR. CIERI: But the point is, this is a difficult fiduciary duty issue for
a director because do you try to avoid bankruptcy by securing old
money, getting forbearance in exchange or getting some amount of
new money, or are you in effect breaching your fiduciary duties by
doing so?
I think the next slide is pretty easy. Next will we address Martin's
question, and then I will open it up to everybody else.
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The one thing we do know is that if you are a solvent corporation,
you owe your fiduciary responsibilities to your shareholders. There
are a few states that have statutes allowing directors to take into ac-
count the interests of other constituencies. But all in all, with a sol-
vent corporation, fiduciary duties are owed to the shareholders.
Now, what about an insolvent corporation? This is a question law-
yers struggle with. Some lawyers will tell you that upon insolvency,
your fiduciary duties shift solely to your creditors. Others would say,
well, partially, and it's something over which I think a lot of debate
exists. Martin?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, first, in or out of bankruptcy, the share-
holders continue to elect directors so it seems somewhat of an empty
ill-conceived gesture if the directors are supposed to serve a different
constituency.
Second, you can't talk about this in many cases as if it's static be-
cause it's not static. If you take the case of Global Marine which was a
Houston Chapter 11 case in the late '80s. The company was hope-
lessly insolvent. A couple of years later it was number one on For-
tune's list of fasting-growing equity value companies. It went from
insolvency to immense solvency.
The Western Union Company, which was in Chapter 11, through
the name New Valley, went in its Chapter 11 case from insolvent to
solvent. The shareholders ended up taking away more than a hundred
million dollars.
While I think there is a legitimate prospect that the focal point, or
the fulcrum, can move from insolvency back to solvency, it is very
dangerous to say that the directors owe no duties to shareholders.
But this really begs the question of "So what." What are they sup-
posed to do differently? And I think the way they normally deal with
that is their job is maximizing the value of the company, and where it
makes a difference who they owe a duty to, it's usually a risk level.
It's clear that if you're in that zone, it's no time to declare dividends,
solvent or not. And it's clear it's no time to give away assets to
friends, but that's sort of obvious stuff.
When it comes to debating a business proposition, some creditors
might say, don't do it if there's a downside because we'll pay the
downside whereas the upside would go to the shareholders. The
shareholders would say do it because if there's an upside, we would
get it.
The only court that I've seen give a crisp answer to this, is in the-
MR. CIERI: Credit Lyonnais.
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MR. BIENENSTOCK: - Credit Lyonnais case is where Justice Al-
len or Chancellor Allen in his I think it's footnote 5 posits-
MR. CIERI: No, I think it's footnote 7. I'm kidding.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: He posits the situation that the only asset a
company has is a $50 million judgment it just won, and it has about
$14 million worth of creditors. There's a 25 percent chance of affirm-
ance. There's a, say, 50 percent chance that it will be reduced to 4
million and a 25 percent chance that it will be reversed. And you
multiply out all the probabilities and add up the expected value, and it
turns out the expected result is $15 million, and they're given a $14
million offer to settle the appeal. Should the directors take it or not?
And Chancellor Allen says, no, because the expected value is 15, and
that would be unfair to shareholders.
Frankly, I don't subscribe to that because there was over a 50 per-
cent chance that you'd lose and it would be creditors affected. But
that's the way he did it. That's the only decision I've seen that comes
to grips with the big question and says here's how you answer it.
MR. CIERI: Well, do you think, Martin, it doesn't really matter who
the duties are owed to, whether it's shareholders or creditors as long
as directors take actions to maximize the value of the enterprise?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Yes. I think Judge Ambro's, of the Third Cir-
cuit, decision in United Artists where he said it's okay for an estate to
indemnify financial advisors against negligence supports your state-
ment. He stated that a decision of what is negligence, should borrow
from the business judgment rule. You should make sure that the di-
rectors and officers were disinterested, made themselves aware of all
of the alternatives, and had a rational process to choose the one that
maximized value.
I think if you go through those steps, whether your duty is to credi-
tors or shareholders, you're going to be fine.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: But doesn't that raise an issue in the nonpublic
company context? We represent a lot of private equity firms in our
practice, and you often have the situation where the private equity
sponsor designates three, four members of the board. It may be their
equity is flushed. They're wearing their directors' hat. They're not
wearing their constituents' hat. And they are evaluating alternatives
about whether you can salvage a situation or not.
Maybe someone says they're playing with the house's money.
Maybe someone says they're not disinterested, and it's going to be an
absolute fairness type of test and not business judgment.
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So what your director does, depends on who he is or she is and how
they are going to be perceived in the litigation that is likely to come
down the road.
MR. FISCHER: What is your director's duty?
MR. CIERI: Which means process, right? You need to make sure
that the process is documented in order to protect those directors. I'm
sorry, David.
MR. FISCHER: What's the director's duty when, in this long period
of time, in this well-orchestrated bankruptcy you start amassing the
first day motions? Does the director tell the company to pay every-
thing COD?
And let's take the case where your client is the private equity firm,
and they know they're going to file. They don't know exactly when,
but it's going to be sometime in the next two, three weeks, or a month.
Do they have to be concerned about trade debt that they're amassing
and not going to pay for?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, you see, they do if you set it up as you
did, which is why we don't set it up that way. We make it very clear to
the company and the directors they don't know that they are going to
file, and they are not going to know until they vote on the resolution,
which will be a few hours before we file.
We do this because we're going to look for every alternative to fil-
ing with banks and exchange offers and out of court things.
MR. FISCHER: That's the record you will create, but I've got to be-
lieve that the person on the jury isn't going to buy it. It has always
really troubled me as to what you do building up. How do you advise
a director building up to when you know you're going to file.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: That's simple. We tell our directors, "when
you know you're going to file, you're not going to take on credit.
You're not going to take credit that you know you're not going to
pay." It's as simple as that. There are criminal laws against doing
that.
MR. FISCHER: I agree.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Although truth be told, there are reclamation
claims in bankruptcy because people are ordering-you're ordering
product-
MR. FISCHER: People do that.
HON. FITZGERALD: Almost every retail store has to boost the
product up because they're going to go on COD or have to have a
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letter of credit posted the day they file. As you said, in fact, as soon as
the word gets out that they're going to file.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And build their inventory while they go.
HON. FITZGERALD: And they have to build their inventory while
they can, or they have no chance of reorganizing later.
MR. FISCHER: There's a death spiral. And, secondly, I think de-
pending upon how you say what you say, there can be securities is-
sues-
HON. FITZGERALD: There could be, sure.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: I'll ask the next thing. Under Sarbanes-
Oxley,' once you make the decision that you're crossing, don't you
have to make a public disclosure?
MR. CIERI: I think you're absolutely right.
MR. FISCHER: I think you're right.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Right or wrong?
MR. CIERI: Right.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: That's what I was afraid you said.
MR. FISCHER: And it's a real sticky situation as to how you can
evaluate that option, give the law firm $3 million to get going, and
then say, "But I wasn't really sure I was going to do it."
MR. CIERI: Well, that wasn't really clear. I was serious. To sort of
just move on a little bit, I think as Martin said, the real key issue,
whether insolvent, solvent and working that zone is being able to
demonstrate that directors are taking action that maximizes the value
of the estate. In 20/20 hindsight, your directors have to be in a posi-
tion to overcome the skepticism of a jury regarding their activity.
We're just going to talk a second about the business judgment rule,
and then I'm going to ask Marc a question because Kirkland & Ellis,
Marc's firm, does represent a lot of private equity funds.
All of you know what the business judgment rule is. In fact, it's a
presumption that directors act in good faith and in the best interest of
the corporation. Directors have to breach one of their duties, either
the duty of care or the duty of loyalty to not receive the benefits of the
business judgment rule's protection.
It is an imperfect shield, and it's imperfect for a couple of reasons.
It mostly boils down to the fact that a director's duties, in the context
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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of an insolvency situation are again going to be evaluated with 20/20
hindsight. As a result, when we advise boards of directors, we tell
them when you take an action, you should assume that you're not
going to have the protections of the business judgment rule.
There are some cases out there I want to alert you to. I don't know
if anybody thinks they are viable law, but there's some old Delaware
case law that, in effect, say if you're a director of an insolvent corpora-
tion, you should be held to the duties of a strict trustee.
Now, the question I have for Marc is, what do you do in your situa-
tion where you're representing private equity in a portfolio company
that's having financial troubles?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Well, Rick and I, we were involved in a case
recently, a prepackaged case in the Northern District, where Rick ac-
tually served, I guess, as our backup primary counsel in the event we
were disqualified, but also as special counsel.
You have to be able to separate out your relationship with your
private equity client from your relationship with the debtor company
in general. In that particular situation, there was a recapitalization of
the company a couple of years before the case was filed where the
people who were sitting on the board, or their entities that they repre-
sented, took a lot of money out of the business, and things turned out
in a bad way.
When you're representing the company, you have to just make it
very clear who you're representing, what you're representing, what
you're not representing, send your private equity directors and your
private equity clients off to get other counsel, maintain a strict wall of
separation, and don't have people who work on the transaction work-
ing on your workout.
As far as the directors go, your advice to them is that they have to,
at all times, have the hat of a director on and not walk into the direc-
tor's room thinking and acting like they're there to protect the inter-
ests of the equity holder, the stakeholder.
MR. FISCHER: To get hired, how expansive was your affidavit?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Oh, we laid it all out there, and we'll talk about
this in the next section, but full disclosure is the rule and then let the
chips fall where they may.
MS. MILLER: And, in fact, I was involved recently in an out-of-court
workout where the equity fund retained their counsel that they had
been using pre workout and specifically went and got new indepen-
dent counsel to serve as counsel for the debtor to make sure that they
didn't have to worry about any of the advice that had been given, any
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of the disclosures that had been made. It really created a good wall on
a go-forward basis where you didn't have to worry about making
those kinds of disclosures.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And we considered doing it that way, ducking
out early on and representing the equity, but we had represented the
company for a number of years, knew the business extremely well,
and they were loath to have someone who wasn't as familiar take
them through the process. We had Rick standing by to do that and he
would have done it if need be.
MR. CIERI: But they were loath to use me.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: That's not true, not true at all.
MR. CIERI: Let me ask you a question about the next slide. Every-
body obviously knows what preference law is. And the question is, do
directors breach their fiduciary duty when they favor one group of
creditors over another? Is it a breach of fiduciary duty to secure some
old money and not all the old money, or is the only remedy
preference?
And, again, there is this very undefined view out there that direc-
tors have this duty to treat everybody fairly. What exactly does that
mean? Does anybody have a response?
HON. FITZGERALD: Who is the everybody? You know, what hap-
pens in a mass tort case where you've got all this contingent liability
out there that you don't even know, do you have an obligation to treat
that potential group fairly?
MS. MILLER: But ultimately do you justify it because by preferring
a particular group, you're able to maximize value that ultimately can
result in the turn around?
MR. FISCHER: Because they're going to give you new money.
MS. MILLER: That's right.
MR. FISCHER: And the tort claimants probably aren't going to give
you the new money.
MS. MILLER: You're going to get consideration for it.
MR. FISCHER: But I think you can't just secure the old money with-
out procuring the benefit from the old money.
MR. BAIRD: What's the legal theory of why they don't do that, just
so we're-
MR. CIERI: Breach of fiduciary duty because in effect you're prefer-
ring one group of creditors over another. Or in the situation David's
2003]
550 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
positing regarding you secure some old money, not all the old money,
the company has subsequently filed, have the directors committed a
fraudulent conveyance because you didn't get enough-you didn't get
reasonably equivalent value?
MR. BAIRD: But if you're making a transfer on account of antece-
dent debt, you've got value as far as fraudulent conveyance now is
concerned.
HON. FITZGERALD: Correct. But the issue may not be a breach
of duty of care. It may be a breach of the duty of loyalty. That's why I
asked the question who is it that you have to be fair to? Because you
can go through your due diligence. You can make a rational decision.
Forget business judgment, just a rational, fair decision that securing
this money is the benefit not just for now but for the future, for the
organization.
But if you then somehow or other, in the process of doing that treat
one group of creditors less favorably than another, have you breached
your duty of loyalty?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: You might as well ask, is it wrong to pay off
some creditors that are owed the money?
MR. CIERI: Yes.
HON. FITZGERALD: Yes.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: And the preference statute only goes so far.
The case that I think comes closest to answering these questions is
Judge Walrath's decision last year in Coram Healthcare where she de-
nied confirmation for lack of good faith on the ground that the control
person who had been pivotal in proposing the plan prepetition had
paid interest to some creditors. And she said when you're heading
into Chapter 11, you should be conserving your cash not using it to
pay interest.
And I guess there might be a little liability ultimately assessed
against him for having done that. But that's the only time I've seen
someone be actually charged and held liable for paying a creditor and
not all creditors.
But the argument wasn't you didn't pay all the rest. The argument
was that you shouldn't have paid anyone. You should have saved it
for Chapter 11.
MR. CIERI: I'm going to shift gears just a little bit, and then I'm
going to actually ask a question and not participate in discussion be-
cause of interests I may have in the discussions.
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There is much case law suggesting that director fiduciary duties shift
based upon the solvency of a corporation. The question is how you
measure solvency.
And you hear about two tests, the balance sheet test and the equity
or cash flow test. The idea behind the balance sheet test is you write
up your assets to their fair value and you write them down, and the
liabilities side you don't only deal with liabilities that are recognized
by GAAP, you also deal with contingent liabilities that may not be on
the balance sheet.
The equity or cash flow test looks as to whether or not the corpora-
tion can pay its debts as they come due, and even in that test, you
really do look at the true value of the assets or the true value of the
liabilities.
And at least when we're advising clients, and I'm sure it's probably
true with the other panelists, we always tell companies to take a very
conservative approach in determining their solvency and create a re-
cord, again, to be able to defend their conclusions.
But the question I have for our panelists is, how do you measure
contingent liabilities in your solvency analysis? Clearly there's a lot of
case law out there that says-or at least we all thought that the way
you measure contingent liabilities was you take the maximum amount
of liabilities discounted by the probability of its actual occurrence.
Recent case law now developing in the Third Circuit suggests perhaps
a different approach.
Where is this all going? I'm not getting an answer.
MR. BAIRD: Just so we're clear, when you talk about case law devel-
opment in the Third Circuit, do you mean the Sealed Air or do you
mean something else?
MR. CIERI: Yes, Sealed Air.
HON. FITZGERALD: Sealed Air, in case the group doesn't know
what it is, decided that you measure the contingent liability as it actu-
ally happened on a particular date. You can't look to what you knew
or reasonably should have known was your liability. You have to take
what your actual liability was and apply it retrospectively to the date
you're looking at. That's the effect.
MR. CIERI: Well, let me just state the two ends of how you look at
things.
Some case law, very few cases, and they are just wrong, say you
actually take the face amount of the liabilities, and you don't discount
them. That's crazy. I mean, when you have a lawsuit filed against you
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for $10 billion, and there's a 1 percent chance that party will win, you
should not have to place on your hypothetical balance sheet $10 bil-
lion liability.
On the other end, which was the approach that I think most of us
thought was the right one, you take that $10 billion lawsuit, and you
discount it by the probability of its success. And if it's 1 percent, you
probably won't even put it on your balance sheet because it's such a
low, low probability. But if it's 10 or 20 percent, your hypothetical
balance sheet should reflect that liability.
Now, Sealed Air says when you're dealing with mass tort claims, you
have to assume, for purposes of determining solvency, that that injury
actually occurred. You don't discount that claim by the probability
that it will actually be asserted. So what does that mean?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Then does that put it in the class of cases you
said were wrong?
MR. CIERI: Yes.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Okay.
MR. CIERI: So what does that mean for directors of corporations
that have large contingent judgments that have been asserted against
them or directors of corporations that have mass tort problems?
HON. FITZGERALD: Their D & 0 insurance better be paid up.
That's what it means.
MR. FISCHER: It means it can't be.
MR. BAIRD: But you have to be careful. Sealed Air was a prelimi-
nary decision. The case was settled before it went to trial.
In any event, the Seventh Circuit law is quite different. Moreover,
the problem in Sealed Air was peculiar. You had a shoveling of assets
from one firm to another firm with the hope that the assets you shov-
eled would be insulated from any subsequent mass tort liability.
So you already have a firm that knows it has mass tort liability-
MR. CIERI: I don't know. I think I am hearing you say that you
don't like this decision, but you like Judge Grady's decision in K-Mart.
MR. BAIRD: No, I didn't say I liked Judge Grady's decision. I said
you couldn't be surprised by it.
MR. FISCHER: If we were to take a vote, we all thought you were
on the side of you liked it. Just teasing.
MR. CIERI: If you're a director of Philip Morris today, do you make
a dividend payment?
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HON. FITZGERALD: I don't think so.
MS. MILLER: I don't think so.
MR. CIERI: Why?
HON. FITZGERALD: They're still selling cigarettes.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: What about McDonald's, there's going to be
obesity lawsuits.
MR. CIERI: But let's stay with the- again, and I really have to be
careful how I participate in this discussion, but do you make a divi-
dend payment or not if you're a director of Philip Morris in light of
the judgment or in light of all these lawsuits that are pending against
them? Martin?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, Rick, I can't imagine that the courts in
Illinois are going to look favorably on varying the bonding standards if
Philip Morris purports to declare a dividend. Now, the shareholders
might be clamoring that possession is 90 percent of the law; give us the
money. But I think that's the surest way to make sure that it's driven
into bankruptcy and doesn't get some type of bonding remedy be-
cause no trial court could stand for that if they really want to appeal
while staying out of Chapter 11, which they likely want to do.
Also, if the amount of the judgment makes them insolvent-I
mean, it is a judgment. It's not like it is contingent liability. It's a
judgment. It's real today, and there's no two ways about it. Now, I
don't know enough about their financial statements to know if that
alone makes them insolvent. If it does, you clearly can't declare a
dividend.
MR. FISCHER: What's the effect of the punitive damage decision of
a few days ago on the 12 billion?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, who knows what the Supreme Court's
decision will do to Philip Morris.
MS. MILLER: How do you even reorganize someone when they're
continuing to commit the wrong? It's not like the bad behavior that
the lawsuits are being brought up on and on which judgments are be-
ing issued has been cured.
MR. FISCHER: I'm not a smoker, and I don't want my children to
smoke, but I'm not sure that it's true that continuing to sell cigarettes,
given the notoriety that everyone who smokes cigarettes now knows
the problems, means you're continuing to commit the wrong.
MR. CIERI: Well, I just want to focus on the question, though, of
solvency. What does a director of a corporation that has a large judg-
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ment against it or numerous lawsuits relating to a product that it sold
in the past do?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: But there's an even thornier issue, Rick. April
15th is when companies report to the PBGC on their pension liabili-
ties, and the market hasn't rebounded. And there's tons of un-
derfunded plans out there for companies that people otherwise think
of as rock solid. I mean, some people think General Motors, if you
look at pension liabilities, has real issues from the balance sheet. I
have no idea whether they do or they don't, but is that an issue where
they ought to be thinking about holding back on their dividends under
that theory? I mean, pension liabilities, that's-if the market doesn't
turn around, is an obligation that's out there.
MR. CIERI: So you're suggesting, Marc, that under the cash flow test
of solvency, a corporation's director needs to look at the amortization
payments that may need to be made to the PBGC?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Sure. Why not?
MR. FISCHER: I think the real thing with the cigarette industry had
been that for so many years they succeeded in defending those cases,
and now I don't know how many verdicts they have against them, but
it is likely not that many. And the question is, can the directors say,
well, just because I got one, does that mean I'm going to lose the other
cases or I'm going to win the other cases? Because they always won
them for a long period of time, and that was their argument.
HON. FITZGERALD: But this may not be the best type of analysis
to look at because the issues are somewhat unique in that industry.
Part of their injunction says they can't market to teenagers, and then
you look at Joe Camel smoking cigarettes on TV. I mean, who is the
marketing directed to if it's not to a younger set?
And I'm not-it's not a pejorative statement one way or another,
it's just I've seen an ad like that, and I wonder whether they're set-
ting-the industry itself appreciates what its own potential liability at
some point may be. And I think it's a legitimate question to ask
whether under those circumstances facing judgments with many law-
suits pending a director knowing that its company is still marketing,
regardless of how, ought to be paying a dividend. Because as long as
there's marketing, there are going to be lawsuits.
Now, will they be successful? I don't know, but they have experts
who evaluate the potential risks and upside, and the question is, is that
going to have to be disclosed? I would say it probably does.
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MR. CIERI: But is it fair to say-and this is a problem that's not just
unique to Philip Morris. It's a problem that every corporation who
has a mass tort problem faces.
GARY LEWIS: Question. I'm a member of a board of directors, and
the question comes up with reference to a dividend. There is insur-
ance. There's a cash flow. And even if there is a large judgment
against the corporation, I am going to say that judgment will be settled
at 75 percent or 65 percent or somewhere down the road. If I have
reason to believe that with prospective cash flow, even if we don't
make it, we'll come close to meeting that obligation, I would probably
vote to approve a dividend to be issued feeling that if worse comes to
worse, that's what you've got directors' insurance for.
GARY LEWIS: So my personal assets aren't really going to get af-
fected. If there was a risk as to my personal assets, then I'd probably
resign.
GARY PLOTKIN: But the D & 0 insurance now is much more re-
strictive than it was three or five years ago, and you may not have
coverage, and that's a problem.
MR. CIERI: And, also, I always think it's difficult to go home and
explain to your significant other why you're being sued.
MR. FISCHER: You can probably explain it to her, but never your
children.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Rick, I just wanted to mention one other
thing. Going back to Judge Wolin's decision in Sealed Air, the deci-
sion I think could stand for something that might be more palatable to
you because I'm not sure he was really talking about discounting the
likelihood of claims. He was saying you can look backwards, in fact,
you have to and count the liability that existed at that time that you
know of.
Now, what makes that decision very unique and potentially useful
in the asbestos bankruptcies is that the liability he was talking about is
what we all call future claims; at the time they were determining sol-
vency had the company gone into Chapter 11 at that moment, its lia-
bility, its claims, would have been separate from the future claims
because the future claims were held by people who had been exposed
to asbestos prepetition but by and large had not manifested injury at
that time of the Sealed Air transaction.
And as I understood his decision, he was saying that asbestos is now
so well known as a potential and basically bad substance. Everyone
who worked in shipyards, construction sites, and the like with asbestos
knows they did, that they can no longer be considered not claims, and,
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therefore, not part of the liability picture, but that they are all now
present claims.
I really wonder based on his decision whether you can now go into a
Chapter 11 case with an asbestos manufacturer and say you don't
need a § 524(g) injunction against future claims because there are
none. They're all present based on Judge Wolin's analysis.
HON. FITZGERALD: In that opinion, though, I think the difficulty
is the transaction took place in 1996, and he's applying what you know
in 2002, which is when the opinion came down, retrospectively to
1996. And I agree there was an evaluation issue. That's what the trial
was going to be about, but they settled. So I agree with you about the
discount. I don't think he gets into the discount issue in that opinion.
But the retrospective application I think is quite difficult to apply.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Except that in the asbestos industry, we've
had models going back to the late '80s that project future claims.
They often do not project enough of them, but they've projected
them. So even in '96 they had a projection of future claims. The ques-
tion was whether you count that in determining your solvency, and
he's saying you have to.
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